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Abstract 
The nine-dot problem is a classic in the field of human problem solving.  Cognitive accounts 
of the problem’s difficulty have been criticised on the grounds that the experimental methods 
on which they rely for support involve a qualitative change to the task requirements of the 
problem.  The three experiments reported here utilise visual and visual-procedural hints to 
examine the notion that its difficulty is rooted in a mismatch between problem shape and 
solution shape.  Experiment 1 demonstrated that a perceptual cue to the shape of the solution 
in the form of shading gave rise to only minimal improvements in performance; an additional 
hint about the relevance of the shading gave rise to modest, but not statistically significant, 
improvements.  Experiment 2 replicated these findings against an additional control condition 
in which a solely verbal hint to violate the perceptual boundary of the problem shape was 
given.  Furthermore, when both the verbal and visual hints were provided, performance 
improved only slightly.  Experiment 3 provided participants with experience in producing the 
shape of the correct solution in problem variants closely related to the nine-dot problem.  
Performance on the transfer task, the basic nine-dot problem, remained at floor, however.  
These data suggest that visual constraint relaxation is unlikely to be the sole process by which 
the insight required to find a solution is achieved. The results are interpreted in terms of a  
previously-proposed computational model of performance. 
When insight just won't come 
Page 4 
The nine-dot problem is a classic problem in the psychology of thinking, and provides a 
powerful demonstration of human failure to solve what appears to be a straightforward spatial 
problem with a simple task description.  The problem is illustrated in Figure 1a.  The task is 
to connect all nine dots with four straight lines, drawn without lifting pencil from paper or 
retracing a line.  The great majority of published accounts of performance on the problem 
report that 0% of participants are able to solve it, despite experimental manipulations that 
either utilise a large number of participants (Weisberg and Alba, 1981, Experiment 1b: 
approximately 50 participants), allow a good deal of time for a solution to be attempted 
(Burnham and Davis, 1969: 10 minutes per attempt), or give participants many separate 
attempts (Weisberg and Alba, 1981, Experiment 1a: 100 attempts).  The highest solution rate 
reported for naïve participants was 9.4% (Lung and Dominowski, 1985).  A popular 
explanation for the problem’s difficulty is that perception of the dot array is governed by the 
Gestalt law of Pragnanz, causing the mental representation of the dots as a square (Scheerer, 
1963).  Participants are unable to solve the problem because they fixate upon the square, and 
consequently fail to consider solution options that do not fall within the boundary of this 
figure.  This account persists in textbooks of Psychology (e.g., Wade and Tavris, 1990; 
Groome, 1999) despite the existence of alternative accounts that propose cognitive rather than 
perceptual factors as the source of the problem’s difficulty (e.g. Weisberg and Alba, 1981; 
Lung and Dominowski, 1985).  
Typically, cognitive accounts seek support from some form of instructional or training 
manipulation which facilitates, or conversely fails to facilitate, problem-solving performance 
in a way that cannot, it is argued, be accounted for within a Gestalt tradition.  For example, 
Burnham and Davis (1969) report a number of instructional manipulations that led to only 
small amounts of facilitation.  The most important manipulation was to instruct participants 
that they could go outside the square formed by the dots, which was intended to override the 
set formed by perceptual grouping of the dots.  Participants receiving this instruction did seek 
solutions by drawing lines outside the dot array perimeter, unlike those receiving no 
instruction, but only 4 out of 15 participants successfully solved the problem. Burnham and 
Davis suggest that the failure of this manipulation to remove all aspects of the problem’s 
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difficulty argues against an account in which problem difficulty is caused by the imposition of 
a rigid perceptual organisation on the dot array.  Similar results are reported by Weisberg and 
Alba (1981, Experiment 1), who instructed participants that they had exhausted all the 
solution possibilities that lay within the square (we subsequently refer to this as the 
‘exhausted square’ hint), and that they would have to go outside the square in order to solve 
the problem.  They found that only 3 out of 15 participants given this hint solved it within 10 
attempts. 
 The conclusion drawn by Burnham and Davis (1969) and by Weisberg and Alba 
(1981) was that the failure of participants to solve the problem when instructed to explore 
solution options outside the square falsifies a Gestalt account of difficulty, since this 
manipulation explicitly overrides the self-imposed perceptual organisation of the problem 
array. This argument seems to us to be conceptually flawed.  The operation of the Gestalt law 
of Pragnanz (e.g., as implemented in Marr’s, 1982, theory of the full primal sketch) is at an 
automatic and pre-conscious level, and cannot be over-ridden by conscious control. Thus, 
whilst participants may be instructed to act contrary to their perceptual processing of the 
problem array, perceptual organisation takes place regardless and may well continue to exert 
an influence over problem-solving performance in opposition to overt instruction.  So, far 
from demonstrating that an explicit dismissal of the ‘square’ interpretation fails to facilitate 
performance, the instructional manipulation may simply be unsuccessful in over-riding the 
organisation and subsequent influence of the problem’s perceptual characteristics. 
Weisberg and Alba (1981) also report data from their first experiment in which 
performance was strongly facilitated by presenting parts of the solution along with the 
‘exhausted square’ hint. In one condition one line of the solution was already drawn (a 
straight diagonal line extending from a point outside of the square and passing through the 
bottom right-hand dot and extending to the top left dot), and 9 out of 13 participants solved 
the problem, taking an average of 5 attempts to do so.  In a second condition participants 
were provided with the first two lines of a correct solution already drawn, the first being the 
diagonal line described above, the second being a horizontal line starting at the end of the 
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diagonal line, passing through the dots on the top row and extending to a non-dot point one 
unit to the right. All 17 participants in this condition solved the problem, generally on their 
first or second attempt. Weisberg and Alba suggest that the absence of complete facilitation 
with the one-line group indicates that the source of difficulty in the problem is not one of 
fixation upon the square figure.  Whilst the facilitation shown by adding lines to the problem 
representation or by instructing problem-solvers on the characteristics of the required solution 
is undeniable, it is hardly surprising. Including in the instructions a component of the solution 
or a procedure for constructing the whole solution is surely bound to improve performance. 
Where we differ from Weisberg and Alba is in the interpretation of their findings.  In the case 
of the nine-dot problem, the addition of solution components not only changes the visual 
display of the problem, but also qualitatively changes the performance options available to 
participants, effectively restricting them to only two starting points (the ends of the drawn 
lines).  Facilitation is cognitively mediated in these experiments, but this may be the case only 
because the task faced by participants is changed qualitatively, by restricting the space of 
possible solutions and then making a search of the restricted space a task requirement.  In 
other words, these manipulations show only that if you tell participants how to solve the 
problems, then they can solve them: they do not properly test the influence of perceptual 
organisation upon problem-solving performance. 
More compelling evidence for a cognitive basis to the nine-dot problem’s difficulty 
comes from experiments in which facilitation emerges through transfer of experience from a 
training task. Weisberg and Alba (1981, Experiment 2) found that nearly half the participants 
trained on problems whose solutions required lines extending beyond the boundary of the 
problem array solved the nine-dot problem, whereas no participant trained on problems 
whose solutions remained within the problem array was able to solve the nine-dot problem.  
They interpret these results as demonstrating that performance on the nine-dot problem 
reflects the transfer of task-specific experience to the problem.  People, they argue, generally 
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encounter dot arrays such as the nine-dot problem in the context of joining-the-dots tasks, and 
therefore consider only the space of dot-to-dot lines in developing their solutions.  Presenting 
lines that do not end on dots, and training in solutions that have lines that do not terminate in 
dots, creates relevant experience that can be applied in the solution of the problem. 
A similar training manipulation is reported by Lung and Dominowski (1985). They 
found that the most powerful facilitation is gained through a combination of training and 
instruction.  They argue that it is not the retrieval of specific experience that blocks 
performance on the nine-dot problem.  Instead, they suggest that it is the addition of a 
constraint that all lines must begin and end on dots that makes the problem difficult, since the 
solution requires lines to turn on a position where there is no dot to anchor them. This is 
similar to Weisberg and Alba’s (1981) account, since the source of problem difficulty is 
proposed to be the failure to consider non-dot points in solution attempts.  
The instructional and training manipulations reported in the literature do undoubtedly 
reduce problem difficulty, but they are all open to the same criticism that they present 
participants with components of the solution. One might argue that the most surprising aspect 
of these attempts at facilitation is that they are not perfect, suggesting that there must be some 
other aspect of the problem that determines difficulty beyond the conscious cognitive 
strategies adopted by participants.  Interestingly, the strongest facilitation in nine-dot 
performance comes from a presentational manipulation.  Burnham and Davis (1969) report 
that between 80% and 95% of participants were able to solve an eleven dot variant of the 
problem (illustrated in Figure 1b) within 10 minutes.  They interpret this manipulation as 
providing “a direction and rationale for drawing the necessary four lines for the solution”, that 
is, offering a template for the solution pattern.  Having dismissed the Gestalt account on the 
basis of their ‘hint’ data, they do not examine the possibility that the eleven-dot problem is 
facilitative precisely because the figure presented by the problem matches the figure required 
by the solution.  However, their data are compatible with this problem-solution perceptual 
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mapping account, and also with the dot-to-dot account of Weisberg and Alba (1981) and the 
dot-turning-points account of Lung and Dominowski (1985). 
Previously, we proposed that problem difficulty arises because of figural factors, 
specifically because of the problem of mapping the arrow-like shape of the correct solution 
on to the Gestalt (a square) of the standard nine-dot problem (Ormerod, Chronicle and 
MacGregor, 1997).  We will refer to this as the problem-solution perceptual mapping 
account.  The eleven-dot problem of Burnham and Davis is easy to solve because the problem 
and solution both form arrow shapes. As a test of this hypothesis a revised version of the 
eleven-dot problem, shown in Figure 1c, was given to participants (Ormerod et al, 1997, 
Experiment 2). In this problem, dots that are additional to the standard nine-dot problem (the 
top right and bottom left dots) were left unfilled, and participants were instructed to solve the 
standard nine-dot problem using these additional dots as guides to the solution. Thus the 
availability of the extra dots for line extension and turning points was maintained but the 
perceptual salience of the arrow shape of the solution was reduced. After five trials, only 33% 
of participants solved this problem, compared with between 80 and 95% in Burnham and 
Davis’ (1969) studies. An apparently minor perceptual change in the problem representation, 
in which the standard nine-dot problem was made distinct within the arrow-like eleven-dot 
problem, inhibited performance. We argued that the drop in solution rates could not be 
accounted for by either of the cognitive accounts of problem difficulty: rather, the availability 
of solution shape information was the critical determinant of success. The provision of 
additional dots as guides and the instruction for participants to use them in constructing their 
solution effectively reduces the problem to one of drawing dot-to-dot lines as specified in 
Weisberg and Alba’s (1981) account and removes the non-dot turning-points implicated in 
Lung and Dominowski’s (1985) account. However, like some of the studies criticised above, 
our experiment (Ormerod et al, 1997) effectively changed the task demands of the problem: it 
may be, for example, that participants did not fully understand the instruction to utilise the 
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unfilled dots in solving the nine-dot problem.  To provide a proper test of previous accounts 
against our problem-solution perceptual mapping account requires interventions that do not 
qualitatively change the task demands of the problem itself. 
More recently we proposed a computational model of performance on the nine-dot 
and similar problems (MacGregor, Ormerod and Chronicle, 2000) which is capable of more 
detailed predictions than previous cognitive approaches.  The model is in the tradition of 
information-processing models of problem-solving (Newell and Simon, 1972) and consists of 
three main components, comprising i) scope of search, ii) move selection, and iii) move 
evaluation based on a criterion of progress towards the goal.  The scope of search is governed 
by mental “lookahead”, the number of lines the person considers in advance.  In the case of 
the nine-dot problem, this may range from a minimum of one to a maximum of four. Move 
selection is governed by the locally-rational strategy of choosing the line(s) which intersect(s) 
the maximum number of dots, within the limits imposed by lookahead. Selecting moves that 
maximise the number of dots cancelled represents a form of “hill-climbing” or “difference 
reduction”, and is consistent with the view that humans make choices under conditions of 
bounded rationality (Chater and Oaksford, 1999; Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 
1990).  Move evaluation tests the move(s) suggested by this operator against a criterion of 
progress based on the ratio of the number of dots remaining to the number of lines remaining.  
The intuitive basis of this is the notion that the perceived progress supplied by a move will 
depend not just on the number of dots cancelled, but on their number relative to the number 
of dots and lines remaining.  Thus, for example, a move that cancels one dot only may be 
unacceptable when many dots and few lines remain, but acceptable if few dots and many lines 
remain.  The criterion we propose is  that to be acceptable a move must cancel a minimum of 
the ratio of the remaining number of dots to lines.  Criterion-failure results when no 
acceptable move can be found, and may lead to modification or abandonment of the primary 
operator.   
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To exemplify these three components, consider a participant who is tackling the 
standard nine-dot problem shown in Figure 1a.  Imagine that he or she has a lookahead value 
of two, and that he or she intends to start at the bottom left-hand corner dot.  One of the most 
likely moves for this person to make is simply to draw round two sides of the dot array.  This 
cancels five dots, and thus satisfies the criterion described above (as more than half of the 
dots are cancelled by using exactly half the number of lines available).  Another participant 
operating at a lookahead value of three will, in all likelihood, draw round three sides of the 
dot array, thus cancelling more than three-quarters of the dots with three out of four lines.  
Both participants will, however, then find themselves unable to find a successful solution: 
they have been misled by the early success of their primary operator.  Note that both these 
moves are apparent in data from human solvers: furthermore, moves that do not conform to 
the model's predictions - such as going from the bottom left-hand dot, up one dot, then over 
to the middle dot - are only infrequently observed. 
The model outlined above predicts that anyone operating at less than four lookahead 
will fail to solve the nine-dot problem, at least on initial attempts.  This is because, at 
lookahead values of one, two and three, criterion-failure does not occur early enough in the 
solution process to prompt a search for alternative, non-model, moves.  The results for the 
nine-dot problem reported in our first experiment (MacGregor et al, 2000) supported these 
predictions, with 96% of classifiable first responses being consistent with the model.  Model 
compliance dropped to 71% on the second attempt, and to 53% on subsequent attempts, 
suggesting that repeated failures may lead to a search for other strategies.  Nevertheless, the 
overall level of model compliance was high.  The model also accurately predicted relative 
success rates for problems such as those shown in Figure 2 (MacGregor et al, 2000). 
In contrast to these positive predictions the present article is concerned with a set of 
negative predictions, where the model and its associated results suggest performance failures 
in the face of experimental manipulations that, on all other reasonable grounds, might be 
When insight just won't come 
Page 11 
expected to greatly facilitate performance on the nine-dot problem.  The article reports three 
experiments designed to test the importance of figural factors, in which visual cues to the 
solution of the nine-dot problem are provided in a manner designed to avoid the conceptual 
difficulties in earlier research identified above. That is, the visual cues neither change the task 
requirement for participants, nor explicitly provide components of either the solution itself or 
of the “insight” required to find a successful solution (that is, drawing lines outside of the 
square boundary implied by the nine-dot array).  Experiment 1 examines the effect of 
providing (a) a solution-relevant, Gestalt organisation superimposed on the problem in the 
form of shading, and (b) the same superimposed shading with an additional written hint as to 
its relevance.  Under both the traditional Gestalt account and our problem-solution mapping 
account (Ormerod et al, 1997), this manipulation should facilitate problem solution. Indeed, 
since the solution form is itself available as a percept, it should remove all aspects of problem 
difficulty.  The computational model we recently proposed, however, would seem to predict 
little or no facilitation, since extending lines as implied by the shading is unnecessary to 
achieve maximum dot cancellation (except when the value of lookahead is at the maximum 
of four moves).  The provision of the written hint in the second condition was suggested by 
the finding of Gick and Holyoak (1980) that hints are necessary to facilitate the use of 
solution-relevant information in some problem-solving situations.  Experiment 2 is similar to 
Experiment 1, but employs a control condition in which a verbal hint to go outside the square 
shape of the problem was given, in order to directly compare the effects of verbal and 
perceptual hints.  Experiment 3 uses a training-transfer paradigm to examine whether 
experience with the production of a directly transferable solution shape may successfully 
facilitate performance on the nine-dot problem. 





 Two groups of participants were tested in two hint conditions: Shading Only, and 
Shading plus Hint.  A no-hint condition was not included in the design because of the robust 
and often-replicated floor effect with the nine-dot problem presented alone – instead we used 
previous results to estimate the expected frequency of solvers under the null hypothesis of no 
effect of hint. 
 Participants 
 Eighty-seven people volunteered to participate in the experiment during a 
Departmental Open Day.  Four did not follow instructions correctly and their sheets were 
discarded.  In the remaining 83, there were 38 men and 44 women, with ages ranging from 18 
to 65 (mean age: 45 years).  One participant declined to give age and gender information. 
 Materials 
 Each participant was provided with a single sheet, on which were printed the problem 
instructions, problem and visual cue, written hint (in the second condition only) and questions 
about prior experience with the problem, plus spaces to record age and gender.  The problem 
and visual cue are reproduced in Figure 1d.  The problem instructions were as follows:  
“Your task is to draw four lines which, between them, go through all the nine dots.  However, 
you must abide by the following constraints: the lines must be straight; the lines must be 
connected; once you have started drawing you must not lift your pen off the page; you must 
not retrace over a line you have already drawn.”  In the Shading plus Hint condition, the 
following was printed above the problem: “HINT: You may find it helpful to consider the 
shading under the nine dots when trying to find a solution”. 
Procedure 
 Both groups of participants were tested in a group setting in a University lecture 
theatre.  Problem sheets for the two conditions were distributed in random order, and 
participants asked to keep the sheet face down until told to turn over.  The experimenter 
explained the general purpose of the experiment, and went through the problem instructions 
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verbally, answering any queries that participants had.  Participants were then told to 
commence the problem, and were given three minutes to complete it.  Following the 
procedure participants were told of the purpose of the experiment, and shown the solution. 
___________________________________ 
Figure 1 about here 
___________________________________ 
Results 
Of the 83 participants, 25 stated that they had seen the nine-dot problem and solution before: 
data from these participants were excluded from further analysis.  Of the remaining 31 in the 
Shading Only condition, 5 (16%) solved the problem, while 8 of 27 (30%) in the Shading 
plus Hint condition solved it. Analysis of the solution accuracy data showed no significant 
difference between the two conditions in the proportion of participants finding a correct 
solution (χ
2
=1.51, df=1; p=0.22).   
Further comparisons were made against expected frequencies of solution based on the 
results reported in previous published studies.  Three of the published studies for which 
sample sizes were given reported zero solvers, based on samples of 15 (Burnham and Davis, 
1969), 15 and 12 (Weisberg and Alba, Experiments 1 and 1c, respectively).  Two studies 
reported three solvers, based on samples of 32 and 33 (from Weisberg and Alba, 1981, 
Experiment 1a and Lung and Dominowski, 1985, respectively).  We took the average of these 
results as the population solution rate (5.6%) against which to test the goodness-of-fit of the 
present sample results, using the one–sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (the χ
2
 test was not 
used because of small expected frequencies).  For neither condition did the observed 
probability of solving significantly exceed the expected value (DMAX = .11, p>0.20 for the 
Shading Only condition, and DMAX = 0.24, p>0.05 for the Shading plus Hint).   
 Failed solution attempts were examined for information regarding the problem 
solving process.  Of the 26 failed attempts in the Shading Only condition 10 (38%) were 
blank.  Similarly, of the 19 in the Shading plus Hint condition, 9 (47%) were blank.  The 
remainder were classified in two ways: first, in terms of whether or not the solution attempt 
was consistent with the computational model, and second, in terms of whether or not any 
When insight just won't come 
Page 14 
attempt at a line extension beyond the square shape of the nine dots had been made.  Here and 
in the following experiments, we report percentages based first on classifiable attempts only, 
then on all responses (including blanks and unclassifiable attempts) in the format aa%/bb%.  
Statistical tests are based on the former.  In the Shading Only condition, eight attempts 
(50%/31%) were consistent with the model, and in the Shading plus Hint condition, five 
attempts (50%/26%) were consistent.  Of all the non model-consistent attempts in both 
conditions, five extended a line beyond the square, three (19%/12%) in the Shading Only 
condition, and two (20%/11%) in Shading plus Hint.  The difference was not significant, 
p=.57, Fisher exact test. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 provided little or no evidence that, when given a visual cue as to 
the shape of the solution, participants are more likely to solve the nine-dot problem than with 
no visual cue present.  The shaded solution shape seems, on the face of it, to provide an 
unambiguous pointer to the solution, and it is perhaps surprising that so few participants 
capitalised upon it. With an explicit written hint to use the cue to construct the solution, 
success rates improved slightly, but not to a degree that was significantly greater than the 
proportion in the Shading Only condition or, for that matter, the proportion expected with no 
hint at all, based on previous research.  At an intuitive level, it remains surprising that only 
30% of participants found a solution in this case even when (a) the shape of the solution was 
perceptually available and (b) the written hint clearly indicated the relevance of this 
alternative shape information.  These data tend, on the face of it, to argue against our previous 
suggestion (Ormerod et al, 1997) that problem/solution shape incongruence underlies the 
difficulty of the nine-dot problem.  They are, however, consistent with our more recent 
computational approach (MacGregor et al, 2000). 
 A more detailed analysis of failed solution attempts further supported the conclusion 
that there were little or no differences between the two conditions.  In many cases participants 
simply failed to produce any response.  However, of those who did, 50% in each condition 
generated solution attempts that were consistent with the computational model, while 
When insight just won't come 
Page 15 
relatively few extended lines beyond the boundary of the nine dots.  We comment further on 
the observed level of model compliance in the General Discussion. 
One disadvantage with the design of Experiment 1 is that no direct comparison was 
possible between the visual cues we used and the verbal “exhausted square” hint used by 
Weisberg and Alba (1981).  Although the facilitation provided by the shaded solution shape 
was surprisingly small, it remains possible that some aspect of the particular stimuli or 
procedure prevented participants from successfully finding a solution.  In order to address this 




 Three groups of participants were tested in three hint conditions: (1) written hint to go 
outside the square shape of the problem, henceforth the Exhausted Square condition, (2) 
shading plus a written hint to use the shading as an aid (identical to condition B in 
Experiment 1, henceforth the Shading plus Hint condition), (3) shading plus a written hint to 
use the shading, plus a written hint to go outside the square shape of the problem (the 
Shading plus Both Hints condition). 
 Participants and procedure 
 One hundred and forty-nine people volunteered to participate in the experiment during 
several Departmental Open Days.  There were 63 men and 84 women, with ages ranging from 
16 to 62 (mean age: 42 years).  Two participants declined to give gender information, and 
three declined to give age information. 
 Problem sheets were very similar to those used in Experiment 1.  In the Exhausted 
Square condition, the shaded solution shape was omitted, and the following written hint 
presented above the problem: “HINT: Solution attempts whose lines remain entirely within 
the square shaped pattern made by the nine dots cannot succeed”.  The Shading plus Hint 
condition had the shaded solution shape and the following written hint: “HINT: You may find 
it helpful to consider the shading under the nine dots when trying to find a solution”.  The 
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Shading plus Both Hints condition had shading plus both of the written hints above. In other 
respects the procedure was identical to that used in Experiment 1. 
Results 
Of the 149 participants, 39 stated that they had seen the nine-dot problem and solution before: 
data from these participants were excluded from further analysis. Of the remaining 110 there 
were 44, 27 and 39 in the Exhausted Square, Shading plus Hint and Shading plus Both Hints 
conditions. The number (percentages) solving in these conditions were 7 (16%), 7 (26%) and 
13 (33%), respectively.  There was no overall significant difference among conditions, χ
2
= 
3.43, df=2, p=.18. 
 As in Experiment 1, failed solution attempts were examined in detail.  Of the 83 failed 
attempts, 41 (49%) were blank.  The remaining failed attempts were classified for model 
consistency, and overall, 60%/30% were consistent with the model.  Broken down by 
condition, the rates were 45%/24%, 75%/30% and 71%/38% for the Exhausted Square, 
Shading plus Hint and Shading plus Both Hints conditions, respectively. The conditions did 
not differ significantly in this respect, χ
2
= 2.40, df=2, p=.30.  There were six cases of failed 
solution attempts which extended a line beyond the square, four (20%/11%) in the Exhausted 
Square condition, zero in the Shading plus Hint condition and two (14%/8%) in Shading plus 
Both Hints condition.  The difference between conditions was not significant, χ
2




The Exhausted Square and Shading plus Hint conditions gave rise to a comparable pattern of 
performance; it is further notable that the Exhausted Square condition gave rise to similar 
levels of performance when compared with the equivalent condition from Weisberg and Alba 
(1981), where 4 of 15 participants solved the problem.  In addition, the results replicated 
those of the first experiment for the Shading plus Hint condition, with 26% solving compared 
with 30% in Experiment 1.  As with Experiment 1, a potentially surprising feature of the data 
was that solution rates were not considerably higher, particularly in the Shading plus Both 
Hints condition, where it could be argued that participants have explicit hints for cognitive 
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strategy (to go outside the square shape), implicit hints to overcome fixation on the Gestalt of 
the problem (the shaded solution shape) and an explicit instruction that the anti-fixation hint 
might be useful, and as such ought to be solving the problem with near-100% success.   
However, the clear prediction of our computational model is that in all conditions of 
Experiment 2, neither shading nor hints will influence performance, as participants are 
dominated by the initially successful operator of maximum dot cancellation.  Consequently, 
for example, drawing the first three lines of a solution around three sides of the square formed 
by the nine dots cancels seven dots, the maximum possible.  There is therefore no motivation 
to consider using the information provided by the hints to seek moves that extend beyond the 
dot array. 
It is however possible to suggest that a remaining component of the problem’s 
difficulty lies in the execution of the drawn solution. That is, to achieve insight into the 
solution of the nine-dot problem requires not only the provision of solution hints, but also the 
experience of the procedures involved in their application.  A third experiment was conducted 
to investigate this possibility. 
Experiment 3 
In an attempt to provide participants with experience of producing a solution exactly 
akin to the solution required for the nine-dot problem, Experiment 3 trained participants on 
three problem variants with an identical solution shape, which we know from previous 
research can be reliably solved by naïve participants (MacGregor et al , 2000). These 
problems should therefore provide suitable production experience.  Thus the experiment 
employed a training and transfer design.  Participants first received three problems in which 
they were trained to produce the solution shape of the nine-dot problem using eleven-, 
twelve- and thirteen-dot problem variants.  They then received the standard nine-dot problem 
as the transfer task.  
The stimuli used are shown in Figure 2.  In the lower panel, the eleven-dot problem 
consisted of the original nine-dot problem plus two additional dots, one located one unit to 
the left of the upper left-hand dot and a second dot one unit below the bottom-right hand dot 
of the original nine-dot.  The twelve-dot problem was next generated from this eleven-dot 
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version by adding one more dot one diagonal unit from its bottom left-hand dot. Finally (for 
the lower panel) the thirteen-dot problem was obtained by adding one more dot one diagonal 
unit from the bottom left of the twelve-dot.  Each of these problems has dots located at the 
inflection points at the head of the familiar “arrow” shaped solution of the nine-dot problem, 
and are henceforth termed the "Head Complete" problems.  The training stimuli shown in the 
upper panel of Figure 2 were next obtained by removing dots from the ‘head’ of this arrow 
(henceforth termed the "Head Incomplete" problems).  That is, the twelve-dot problem in the 
upper panel was produced by deleting the bottom right-hand dot from the thirteen-dot 
problem.  Similarly, the eleven-dot problem was obtained by deleting the top left-hand dot 
from this twelve-dot version.  (Note that the thirteen-dot problem was identical in both 
conditions).   
Our previous work with problem variants such as those shown in Figure 2 
(MacGregor et al, 2000) suggested that the Head Complete and Head Incomplete conditions 
would provide an effective manipulation of the number of times a correct solution shape 
would be produced.  In the Head Complete conditions shown in the lower panel in Figure 2, 
participants were expected to solve reliably by drawing the arrow shaped solution on to the 
dots provided.  In contrast, for the eleven and twelve-dot Head Incomplete problems, 
participants were not expected to draw the arrow shaped solution.  If, as suggested above, a 
residual source of difficulty in the nine-dot problem is that participants require experience of 
executing the solution in order to solve it, then it would be predicted that the Head Complete 
conditions would lead to higher levels of transfer than the Head Incomplete conditions.  A 
further factor of Order was also included, with training problems either being built up from 
eleven to thirteen dots across problems or reduced.  Order was included to test whether 
transfer would be more likely when training problems became successively better 
approximations, from the point of view of perceptual similarity, to the nine-dot transfer 
problem.  It should be noted that the number of dots forming the tail of the arrow shape of 
these problems does not influence performance despite seemingly providing a cue as to a 
starting point (MacGregor et al, 2000, Experiment 2). 
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In contrast to the preceding predictions, our computational model (MacGregor et al, 
2000) predicts little or no transfer to the nine-dot problem.  For the Head Complete training 
problems participants will, in fact, receive reinforcement if they perform according to the 
maximum dot-cancellation operator of the model, since this will generally be accompanied by 
successful completion of those problems.  Thus they should continue to be dominated by this 
operator on the nine-dot problem, which more-or-less guarantees that a correct solution will 
not be found (except in those cases where criterion-failure occurs, which in turn requires a 
lookahead of four lines).  For the Head Incomplete training problems, the model similarly 
predicts little or no transfer to the nine-dot problem.  Participants will remain consistent to the 
model, and generally attempt to maximise the number of dots cancelled per move: this will 




 The factors manipulated were (a) Problem, either thirteen-dot, twelve-dot, eleven-dot, 
or nine-dot, (b) Shape, either Head Complete or Head Incomplete and (c) Order of training 
trials, either 13-12-11, or 11-12-13.  Factor (a) was assigned within-participants, factors (b) 
and (c) between groups. 
 Participants 
 The participants were 188 undergraduate psychology student volunteers.  As the 
experiment was carried out on a group basis with limited time available, identifiers and age 
information were not collected. 
 Materials 
 Each participant received a printed problem booklet.  The first page gave general 
instructions relevant to all four problems; the instructions were identical to those used in 
Experiment 1.  The following four pages contained the four problems in the appropriate order 
for the experimental condition.  The two Shape conditions for the eleven, twelve and thirteen-
dot problems are shown in Figure 2. A final page asked some debriefing questions about 
participants’ prior knowledge of the nine-dot problem. 
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___________________________________ 
Figure 2 about here 
___________________________________ 
Procedure 
 Testing of participants was undertaken as part of undergraduate lecture classes.  
Problem booklets were distributed to participants, and the instructions outlined verbally by 
the experimenter, any queries being answered at this time.  Participants were given three 
minutes for each problem, and were asked to turn the page to the next problem by the 
experimenter at the correct time intervals.  At the end of the testing period, the purpose of the 
experiment and the correct solution were explained to the group of participants. 
Results 
Seventy participants indicated that they had seen the nine-dot problem on a previous 
occasion, and their solutions were therefore excluded from further analysis.  Each solution to 
each problem from the remaining 118 participants was scored 1 for a correct solution, and 0 
for incorrect. 
 The main results are illustrated in Table 1, which shows the percentage of participants 
producing a correct solution for the sixteen conditions.  Overall, the percentages of 
participants solving the thirteen, twelve, eleven and nine-dot problems were 71%, 43%, 29% 
and 5%, respectively. This overall pattern of results was consistent with our previous findings 
(MacGregor et al, 2000). 
 As a manipulation check, the total numbers of times participants produced solutions 
of the correct shape (the standard arrow-shape shown in Figure 2) were submitted to a 
between participants analysis of variance, with Pattern and Order as the factors.  As expected, 
there was a highly significant effect of pattern, with Head Complete problems giving rise to 
many more correctly shaped solutions (mean = 2.18) than Head Incomplete problems (mean = 
0.88; F(1, 114) = 49.3; p<0.001, MSe = 0.95).  Neither the main effect of Order nor the 
interaction between Pattern and Order were significant. 
 Performance on the nine-dot test trial was also analysed using a between-participants 
analysis of variance, with Pattern and Order of Training as the factors.  The results indicated 
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no significant effects (all p’s>.05), and performances were low across all four conditions 
(Table 1). 
___________________________________ 
Table 1 about here 
___________________________________ 
Failed responses to the nine-dot problem were classified in terms of whether or not 
they were consistent with the computational model.  There were a total of 88 classifiable 
responses (unclassifiable responses were either blank or ambiguous), of which 61 (69%/54%) 
were model consistent.  For the Head Complete shapes, the number (percentages) of model 
consistent responses were eight (80%/47%) and 21 (72%/58%), for the thirteen to eleven and 
eleven to thirteen orders of training, respectively.  The comparable results for the Head 
Incomplete conditions were 13 (52%/42%) and 19 (79%/68%).  The results were analysed 
using a 2x2 between groups analysis of variance, which indicated no significant effect of 
Shape, Order of Training, or their interaction (all p’s > .05).   
The results were further analysed in terms of the number of failed solutions to the 
nine-dot problem that exhibited a line extension beyond the square outline of the dots.  Of the 
93 completed responses, 14 showed line extensions. For the Head Complete shapes, the 
frequencies (percentages) of line extensions were one (8%/6%) and two (7%/6%), for the 
thirteen to eleven and eleven to thirteen orders of training, respectively.  The comparable 
results for the Head Incomplete conditions were eight (31%/25%) and three (12%/9%).  A 
2x2 between groups analysis of variance indicated no significant effects (all p’s > .05).   
 
Discussion 
Solution rates to the nine-dot problem were low across all four combinations of training 
factors, and were not significantly different from each other.  The training manipulation gave 
rise to significantly more experience with correct solution shape production in the Head 
Complete conditions, as expected.  The lack of transfer of the shape of the solution from the 
training problems to the test problem in the Head Complete conditions argues strongly that 
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simple experience with solution shape does not make the nine-dot problem easier to solve.  
This is so despite (a) the identical shape of the solution in all cases; (b) the fact that the nine-
dot problem array is embedded within each of the problem variants, and (c) the fact that in the 
13 to 11 condition, the order of training trials let the participants experience problems that 
were progressively more and more similar to the transfer problem.  This failure to transfer 
experience with the solution shape to the nine-dot problem is consistent, however, with the 
prediction of our computational model.  Since criterion failure will be rare (limited to people 
operating at a lookahead of four lines) there is no impetus to entertain “non-model” moves, 
such as line extensions, thereby guaranteeing failure. 
A more detailed test of the model’s predictions was again made by examining the 
percentage of model consistent solutions to the nine-dot problem.  Overall, 69%/54% of 
responses were consistent with the model, and although there were more in the Head 
Complete than Incomplete conditions, the difference was not statistically significant.  A 
possible criticism of the experimental method used in Experiment 3 is that participants may 
not have been sufficiently aware of the spatial relationship between the training and test 
problems. Indeed, the results we report in Ormerod et al (1997), where participants failed to 
solve an eleven-dot problem in which the standard nine-dot problem was made distinct, tend 
to support this view.  However, this experiment was a one-trial study, in which participants 
did not benefit from any transfer or instructional manipulation.  Therefore, in order to 
examine this point in the context of a training-transfer paradigm, a further 25 participants 
were presented with the training and test problems shown in Figure 3.  The first training 
problem was the standard twelve-dot problem used in Experiment 3 and the second training 
problem had the relevant nine dots distinguished by being unfilled circles.  The test problem 
consisted only of the nine unfilled circles in the normal nine-dot pattern.  Solution rates were 
88, 84 and 12% respectively.  This pattern of data demonstrates that the failure to transfer in 
Experiment 3 was not due to confusion over how the test problem was embedded in the 
training problem: when this relation was made transparently clear, the failure to transfer 
remained. 
___________________________________ 
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In this paper we have argued that previous attempts to study the operation of hints in the nine-
dot problem have been problematic because they qualitatively changed the problem-solver’s 
task.  In addition, they have generally focussed on strategic types of hints presented at a 
cognitive level.  In the experiments reported here, attempts were made to provide visual and 
perceptual-procedural cues to a solution, without varying the task, and without providing 
elements of the solution itself.  It appears from all three experiments, however, that these cues 
to the solution do not provide a great deal of facilitation.  In general, therefore, it might be 
concluded that experiencing the shape of the solution is not in itself sufficient to prompt 
application of that shape to the nine-dot problem.   
 These findings are of considerable interest from a theoretical point of view. The nine-
dot problem has frequently been regarded in the literature as a problem that requires insight 
for a solution.  Ohlsson (1990, p.4) defines insight as occurring “…in the context of an 
impasse, which is unmerited in the sense that the thinker is, in fact, competent to solve the 
problem”.  In the nine-dot case, adult solvers are undoubtedly competent to solve, but 
encounter an impasse which, again in Ohlsson’s terms, has usually been regarded as being 
breakable only by the process of constraint relaxation.  That is to say, the inferred constraint 
on the part of participants to remain within the square shape implied by the array is relaxed, 
so that lines may extend beyond the figural boundary and a solution be found.  In the 
experiments reported here, we would argue that the visual cues provided guide the 
participants strongly towards constraint relaxation – and yet the impasse is broken only in a 
small minority of cases, judging by solution rates.  We therefore suggest that it may be 
worthwhile to consider the process of insight in this problem in a slightly different light. 
 The results of these experiments do not appear to be consistent with either the 
traditional Gestalt account or our problem-solution mapping account (Ormerod et al, 1997).  
Furthermore, the general failure of quite directive hints to encourage participants to use non-
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dot points in constructing a solution is at odds with the theoretical position of Weisberg & 
Alba (1981) and Lung & Dominowski (1985).  Rather, the findings reported here appear to be 
more consistent with our recent computational modelling approach (MacGregor et al, 2000), 
which proposes an operator that seeks to “cancel” as many dots in the problem as possible 
with each solution line.  In the model, a solution to the nine-dot problem can only be achieved 
if the average dot cancellation by each line equals 2.25 – this criterion, in turn, can only be 
achieved if there is sufficient lookahead to find the appropriate solution.  According to the 
model, provision of visual cues to the problem’s solution will not affect the application of the 
cancellation criterion and so should not influence performance on the standard nine-dot 
problem, where the criterion is never violated. The model also has advantages over previous 
cognitive accounts in being able to explain both success and failure in problems that do not 
require non-dot point inclusion. 
The overall rates of model compliant responses to the nine-dot problem ranged from 
45%/24% to 80%/47% in the present experimental conditions. These figures are substantially 
lower than the figure of 96% found previously for a first attempt, and are more in accordance 
with the rates we have reported of 71% for a second attempt and 53% for subsequent attempts 
(MacGregor et al, 2000).  A possible reason for this difference is that the latter study gave 
participants one minute for each of ten attempts, whereas the present experiments allowed 
three minutes for one attempt.  It may be that in the present case some participants’ nominal 
first attempt may effectively have been a second or third attempt because they used the 
additional time to try to discard moves mentally.  
To summarise, we would claim that it is reasonable to regard the processes of 
criterion failure and lookahead embodied in a hill-climbing model of nine-dot problem-
solving as belonging to the route to insight that Ohlsson (1990) terms “re-encoding".  In other 
words, a fundamental reconceptualisation of how the problem may be tackled is required: 
constraint relaxation in and of itself is not sufficient to promote successful solutions.  
Furthermore, it is clear that visual hints designed to aid constraint relaxation, such as those 
examined in the foregoing experiments, are unlikely to impact upon the development of 
operator lookahead, as lookahead is usually thought of as being constrained more by working 
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memory or other capacity limitations than by perceptual factors.  In general, therefore, the 
findings reported here make it very clear that the answer to a problem may be capable of 
eluding human solvers even when it is literally staring them in the face – and furthermore, 
when they are explicitly told that it is staring them in the face.  
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Table 1. Percentage of solvers as a function of the three experimental factors in Experiment 3. 
Problem    13 12 11 9  N 
 
Shape  Order 
 
Complete 13 to 11  78 89 78 6  18 
 
Incomplete 13 to 11  69 9 9 3  32 
 
Complete 11 to 13  81 72 39 0  36 
 
Incomplete 11 to 13  59 19 9 13  32 
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Figure headings 
Figure 1.  (a) The standard nine-dot problem; (b) the eleven-dot version used by Burnham and 
Davis (1969);(c) the eleven-dot variant used by Ormerod et al (1997) and (d) the shading hint 
used in Experiments 1 and 2;.  In all cases, the requirement is to draw four connected straight 
lines through all the dots, without lifting pen from paper, and without retracing. 
Figure 2.  Problems used in Experiment 3.  The requirement for each problem is exactly as 
for the standard nine-dot problem shown in Figure 1a.  The correct solution is shown only for 
the thirteen-dot problem; the solution is identical in all problems. 
Figure 3.  Supplementary problems for Experiment 3.  Panel (a) shows the first training 
problem, panel (b) the second training problem, and panel (c) the standard nine-dot transfer 
problem.  The solution is in all cases identical to that shown in Figure 2. 
 
